By Mohammed Aaqib LLM, LLB (Hons), Treasurer of United Nations Association Coventry Branch

In an attempt to combat the stagnation of humanity’s global nuclear disarmament aspirations, the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons[1] (TPNW) was ambitiously drafted in 2017. Its primary aim was to expedite the ultimate objectives of its predecessor, the Non-Proliferation Treaty (1970). During the drafting process of this nascent Treaty almost four years ago, the General Assembly enlisted the support of the Humanitarian Initiative. Collectively, they recognised the need to work towards a legally binding instrument that would serve as a complete and ‘comprehensive prohibition of the development, testing, production, manufacture, possession or stockpiling of nuclear weapons.’[2]

The TPNW entered into force on 22nd January 2021 following its 50th ratification 90 days earlier.[3] However, the absence of the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council from the list of 86 signatories[4] realistically undermines its application capabilities in practice due to the international standing of these states.

UNA Coventry Debate 2020

In this light, United Nations Association Coventry Branch held a public debate in March 2020 to elucidate the key arguments for and against the current position of the UK government and to determine whether it should be altered. The motion for this debate was:

This house believes the Government of the United Kingdom should sign the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons

Upon being introduced by the debate’s chair, the speaker for the motion first reminded the house of the timely importance of nuclear disarmament (as enabled exclusively by the TPNW) in reference to the persistent threats of nuclear attack. It is clear, ever-present international tensions induce fear and angst among the general populace as well as international delegates.[5] For example, the concerns of an all-out nuclear war were seriously expounded as recently as January 2020 following the American assassination of Iranian General, Qasem Soleimani.[6]

Alongside, weakening political relations by refusing to attend multi-disciplinary dialogues,[7] a failure by the UK government to commit to the eradication of our current nuclear programme also has inextricably damaging effects on our economy and wider society. Arguably, the £205 billion costs to replace our current nuclear programme, Trident[8]would be far better spent on overcoming a copious amount of social challenges we face at home. This money could reduce the strain on the public health, emergency services, and education sectors as well as completely resolving the homelessness crisis, which would cost an estimated £10 billion.[9]

Further discussion points

• As the first multilateral legally binding instrument on this issue,[10] the TPNW will be able to elevate political discussions into the legal realm, potentially opening the door to the development of customary norms.
• The likelihood of pre-emptive attacks[11] is also of concern with submarines becoming less undetectable or accidentally veering off course and confidential information being leaked/hacked, for example.
• The UK must uphold its moral obligations as a global superpower.
• The impact of climate change must compel greater inter-dependence if we are to avoid catastrophe as both issues combined has brought the hands of the doomsday clock to 100 seconds.[12]
• TPNW Article 17 (2)- The UK would have the right to withdraw under extraordinary circumstances which ‘jeopardise the supreme interests’ of the country.[13]

On the other hand, the speaker opposing the motion asserted the value of nuclear weapons as a deterrence[14]mechanism to strengthen our national security. As this is the primary responsibility of every state, committing to complete disarmament independent of the other nuclear states would be irresponsible within an unpredictable international security environment. In contrast to the preceding orator’s opinion, the respondent believed the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)[15]is an adequate instrument to achieve gradual disarmament as it creates a consensus-based, step-by-step process to improve transparency and trust so lasting peace can be assured.[16]

Moreover, the opposing speaker believed the UK has done well to adhere to its commitments[17]under Article 6 of the NPT (pursuing negotiations in good faith)[18]as annual efforts are made to bring the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty[19]into force, a voluntary moratorium was established on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons in 1995,[20] and the UK continues to tri-annually engage with world leaders during the Conference on Disarmament.[21]

Further discussion points

• TPNW Article 16[22] – Reservations to the treaty are not permitted which means the UK cannot hold any specific objections to certain clauses in the treaty, constricting its autonomy further.
• The UK would only have a limited time to dispose of its weapons.
• Unlike the US and Russia, the UK is merely replacing, not increasing, its redundant weapons (although this position has since been reversed).[23]
• TPNW Article 9- The UK will be liable to pay substantial costs for meetings, review conferences, circulation of declarations, implementation of verification measures as well as the costs surrounding the destruction of our current nuclear weapons/programs/facilities.[24]

Following the conclusion of this debate, the audience by a slight margin voted against the motion for the government of the UK to sign the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. Although, this may seem disconcerting for those who vehemently oppose the UK’s current approach to disarmament, the outcome of this debate provided ample discussion points on which constructive conversations can be built going forward. Also, due to the stark differences in opinion of the correct route to take for global disarmament, this debate demonstrated the importance of maintaining unity against our shared concerns. Namely, the complete and holistic eradication of nuclear weapons from every government’s defence system to prevent the possibility of widescale damage and immeasurable suffering of horrific proportions.

References

[1] United Nations, ‘Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons’ (United Nations, 2017) <https://treaties.un.org/doc/Treaties/2017/07/20170707 03-42 PM/Ch_XXVI_9.pdf> accessed 15 July 2021

[2] Susi Snyder, ‘Producing Mass Destruction Private Companies and the Nuclear Weapon Industry’ (Don’t Bank on the Bomb, May 2019) 15 <https://www.dontbankonthebomb.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/2019_Producers-Report-FINAL.pdf> accessed 16 July 2021

[3] UNA-UK, ‘Historic Moment for Disarmament: Nuclear Ban to Enter into Force in January 2021’ (UNA-UK, 23 October 2020) <https://una.org.uk/news/historic-moment-disarmament-nuclear-ban-enter-force-january-2021> accessed 17 July 2021

[4] United Nations Treaty Collection, ‘Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons’ (United Nations, 7 July 2017) <https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXVI-9&chapter=26&clang=_en> accessed 17 July 2021

[5] Jeremy Lybarger, ‘The Threat of Nuclear War’ (American Psychological Association, March 2018) <https://www.apa.org/monitor/2018/03/nuclear-war> accessed 15 July 2021

[6] Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, ‘Soleimani, A Reckless Political Assassination’ (Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, January 3 2020) <https://cnduk.org/soleimani-a-political-assassination-which-risks-destabilising-the-middle-east-even-further/> accessed 15 July 2021

[7] Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, ‘Nuclear Ban is Here: What’s Next?’ (Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, 22 January 2021) <https://cnduk.org/tpnw/> accessed 15 July 2021

[8] Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, ‘£205 billion: The Cost of Trident’ (Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament) <https://cnduk.org/resources/205-billion-cost-trident/> accessed 17 July 2021

[9] Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, ‘Budget 2020- 5% of Trident Cost Can End Homelessness’ (Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, 11 March 2020) <https://cnduk.org/budget-2020-5-of-trident-cost-can-end-homelessness> accessed 17 July 2021

[10] UNA-UK, ‘UN Briefings: The Nuclear Ban Treaty’ (UNA-UK, 3 August 2017) <https://www.una.org.uk/news/un-briefings-nuclear-ban-treaty> accessed 15 July 2021

[11] Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, ‘Threat of Pre-Emptive Nuclear Strikes by NATO Drives Insecurity’ (Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, January 22 2008) <https://cnduk.org/threat-pre-emptive-nuclear-strikes-nato-drives-insecurity/> Accessed 16 July 2021

[12] John Mecklin, ‘This is your Covid Wake Up Call, It Is 100 Seconds to Midnight’ (Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 27 January 2021) <https://thebulletin.org/doomsday-clock/current-time/> accessed 16 July 2021

[13] United Nations, ‘Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons Signature and Ratification’ (United Nations) 21 <https://www.un.org/disarmament/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/tpnw-info-kit-v2.pdf> accessed 14 July 2021

[14] Ministry of Defence, ‘The UK’s Nuclear Deterrent: What You Need to Know’ (GOV.UK, 21 April 2021) <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/uk-nuclear-deterrence-factsheet/uk-nuclear-deterrence-what-you-need-to-know#:~:text=The%20purpose%20of%20nuclear%20deterrence,prevent%20coercion%20and%20deter%20aggression.&text=This%20deters%20states%20from%20using,nuclear%20deterrent%20is%20never%20used> accessed 16 July 2021

[15] United Nations, ‘Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)’ (United Nations) <https://www.un.org/disarmament/wmd/nuclear/npt/text/> accessed 15 July 2017

[16] Foreign and Commonwealth Office, ‘UK Statement on Treaty Prohibiting Nuclear Weapons’ (GOV.UK, 8 July 2017) <https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-statement-on-treaty-prohibiting-nuclear-weapons> accessed 17 July 2021

[17] United Nations, ‘United Kingdom Statement at the UNDC 2017’ (United Nations) <https://www.un.org/disarmament/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/UK1.pdf> accessed 17 July 2021

[18] United Nations, ‘Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons Signature and Ratification’ (United Nations) 16 <https://www.un.org/disarmament/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/tpnw-info-kit-v2.pdf> accessed 16 July 2021

[19] Office for Disarmament Affairs, ‘Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty’ (United Nations) <https://www.un.org/disarmament/wmd/nuclear/ctbt/> accessed 17 July 2017

[20] Foreign and Commonwealth Office, ‘UK Statement to the 2010 Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference’ (GOV.UK, 21 May 2010) <https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-statement-to-the-2010-non-proliferation-treaty-review-conference> accessed 16 July 2021

[21] Aidan Liddle, ‘Conference on Disarmament 2021 Session: UK Statement’ (GOV.UK, 21 January 2021) <https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/conference-on-disarmament-2021-session-uk-statement> accessed 17 July 2021

[22] United Nations, ‘Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons Signature and Ratification’ (United Nations) 21 <https://www.un.org/disarmament/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/tpnw-info-kit-v2.pdf> accessed 14 July 2021

[23] James McKeon, ‘Reversing Course: The UK’s Decision to Increase the Cap on nuclear Warheads’ (Nuclear Threat Initiative, 18 March 2021) <https://www.nti.org/analysis/atomic-pulse/reversing-course-the-uks-decision-to-increase-the-cap-on-nuclear-warheads/> accessed 16 July 2021

[24] United Nations, ‘Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons Signature and Ratification’ (United Nations) 19 <https://www.un.org/disarmament/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/tpnw-info-kit-v2.pdf> accessed 14 July 2021